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book review
Review of A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade
Laura R. Stein1
A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New York: Penguin Press, 
2014. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.
In his book A Troublesome Inheritance, Nicholas Wade, a former science writer for the New York Times, suggests that studying racial diffferences 
should not be avoided but embraced. A key point 
of Wade’s argument is that racial and ethnic difffer-
ences in behavior can be boiled down to genetic 
diffferences and that these genetic diffferences in 
behavior result in diffferences in cultures and societ-
ies, some of which are less well “adapted” for the 
present day than others. Wade uses the fact that 
little is known about the translation of genes to 
behavior to make spurious claims under the guise 
of sounding scientifĳic. Phrases such as “there is 
reasonable evidence that trust has a genetic basis” 
(184) is just general enough to wiggle out of having 
to actually provide that “reasonable evidence.” Close 
examination, however, shows that such evidence 
is scant, should be approached with caution, or 
does not exist. Yet phrases such as this pepper the 
book and are used to then tell just-so stories about 
human societal development, without reasonable 
evidence.
The genetics of behavior have proven noto-
riously difffĳicult to pinpoint. Wade posits that, 
because selection has shaped genetic underpin-
nings of morphology and physiology, it follows that 
selection also shapes genes related to behavior. This 
is not a controversial assumption in itself; indeed, 
the fĳield of behavioral ecology focuses on trying to 
understand the selective pressures that, over time, 
have shaped behavior. In animal models, where one 
can manipulate the environment, breeding, and 
individual genes, it should be easier to determine 
causal genes linked to behaviors than in humans. 
Yet even under these conditions, we still know very 
little (and, it should be noted, Wade acknowledges 
this multiple times throughout the book, himself 
highlighting the speculative nature of his argu-
ment). Not only do we know very little about the 
genetic basis of behaviors; we know even less about 
how genes may influence societies.
One of the major behaviors the book focuses 
on is aggression. Wade describes a study where 
rats were assayed for aggressive behaviors, and 
the extreme phenotypes (i.e., the most and least 
aggressive individuals) were selected to breed. 
The researchers found that aggressive behaviors 
(and it should be noted that behavior was mea-
sured as aggression toward humans, not to other 
rats) were linked to two loci, altogether including 
1,083 genes (Albert et al. 2009). These loci were 
also found to be associated with the size of the 
adrenal gland, responsible for producing “stress” 
hormones often associated with aggression. So, 
even though specifĳic genes underlying aggressive 
(or, arguably, antipredator) behaviors have not 
been uncovered, it can be concluded that indi-
viduals with these genotypes will always be more 
aggressive than their counterparts without them. 
However, the expression of genes is remarkably 
plastic; that is, whether genes will be turned “on” 
or “offf ” is dependent on environmental inputs. 
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Within rats, Dr. Frances Champagne and colleagues 
noticed that mothers vary in the amount of care 
provided to their offfspring. When they quantifĳied 
this behavior, they found that offfspring of moth-
ers that provided less care were less social and 
showed more anxious behavior than offfspring of 
mothers that provided more care (Champagne 
2008). Further, they showed that moving offfspring 
born to a low-caring mother to be raised by a high-
caring mother could reverse these efffects. Maternal 
care produced epigenetic changes (alteration of 
gene expression without alteration of the DNA 
sequence) in the development of the offfspring’s 
adrenal glands, altering behavior without altering 
genes. If behavior in the relatively simple social 
environment of mice can be substantially altered 
without genetic change, we cannot speculate that 
behaviors underlying human societies need be due 
to genetic shifts.
Wade presents the example of rats bred for 
aggression to show that there is a reasonable expec-
tation that the behavior is genetically based. Wade 
then transitions into humans, making the case that 
we have strong evidence for a human gene involved 
in aggression: MAOA. He presents multiple studies 
showing that people with two MAOA promoters 
are more likely to have been involved in violent 
crimes and delinquency, and that these were most 
common in African American men (53–57). And 
yet, nowhere is there a mention that the efffects of 
the two MAOA promoters in increasing juvenile 
delinquency and violence are primarily an interac-
tion with environment: high levels of violence 
only appear if the subjects were maltreated or 
experienced high levels of stress in their home life 
as children (Caspi et al. 2002; Guo et al. 2008); this 
result also held true in a study performed entirely 
in Caucasian children from England and Wales 
(Kim-Cohen et al. 2006). In fact, one of the study 
authors stated in an interview that if children in 
the study with two promoters “have a parent who 
has regular meals with them, then the risk is gone” 
(Fox 2008). Environmental circumstances, here 
parental/adult care, can alter behavioral outcomes 
regardless of the gene sequence, as was seen in 
mice and rats. Diffferential gene expression across 
populations will not, therefore, necessarily result 
in behavioral or, to make a larger leap, societal 
diffferences. Wade acknowledges these results in 
one sentence at the end of the section: “Whether 
a propensity to violence is exercised depends on 
circumstances as well as genetic endowment, so 
that people who live in conditions of poverty and 
unemployment may have more inducements to 
violence than those who are better offf” (57). Per-
haps this sentence would be better placed within 
the discussions of the studies themselves to reflect 
their actual fĳindings.
Another key to genetic underpinnings of so-
cietal success, Wade claims, is genetic diffferences 
in IQ. Intelligence (among other traits) is referred 
to throughout the book as “almost certainly under 
genetic influence” (190) and treated as such. Yet 
what “under genetic influence” actually means 
or how genes are coded into behavior are never 
actually explained. Genetic diffferences in intel-
ligence have long been supposed to occur, as most 
heritability estimates place IQ within a 30–70% 
range (i.e., 30–70% of variation in IQ should be 
able to be explained by inheritance from one’s 
parents). This is a huge range. Keep in mind, this 
leaves 30–70% of variation unaccounted for by 
heritability, suggesting a role of the environment, 
imprecision of measurement, or observer bias. For 
the moment, let’s assume that IQ is a good mea-
sure of intelligence (an issue that itself is heavily 
debated). Similar to the above example with rats, 
environment cannot be discounted. Whether IQ 
scores are “heritable” has been shown to depend 
on environmental efffects, such as maternal experi-
ence (Devlin et al. 1997) and socioeconomic status: 
a study by Turkheimer et al. (2003) found that 
in impoverished families, heritability of IQ was 
close to zero, while in afffluent families, IQ appears 
mostly genetically based.
However, Wade ignores much of the research 
on IQ and environment, choosing instead to focus 
primarily on one study. On pages 202–209, Wade 
describes a study attempting to link causal “in-
telligence” genes (i.e., those associated with high 
IQ scores) to genetic diseases in Ashkenazi Jews; 
the idea here is that Ashkenazim experienced a 
trade-offf between genes conferring intelligence 
and those linked to lethal disease. Arguably, then, 
there are specifĳic genes underlying intelligence that 
are capable of undergoing natural selection, and in 
the rest of the chapter (and earlier in the book) this 
is taken as a given.
However, fĳinding such genes has proven elu-
sive. One reason that it has been difffĳicult to identify 
specifĳic genes associated with intelligence, or with 
any behavior, is that people have millions of iden-
tifĳiable genetic variants. By chance, if you attempt 
to correlate variations in behavior with a million 
genetic variants, some of them will be statistically 
signifĳicant. But are they real, or a statistical artifact? 
Attempts to replicate fĳindings associating specifĳic 
genes with intelligence have largely failed, suggest-
ing many of the fĳindings have been false positives 
(Chabris et al. 2012). Wade concedes that no alleles 
have been found with any certainty, a fĳinding he 
attributes to the idea that each makes too small of 
a contribution to be detected with current methods 
(190). While genes may be associated with behavior, 
environment plays a substantial role in the expres-
sion of those genes. If genes are not expressed in 
the phenotype (i.e., if a behavior encoded by genes 
is not performed), natural selection will be unable 
to act on it either positively or negatively.
Environmental, historical, and other so-
ciological factors are given lip service and quickly 
dismissed. Wade allows himself to do this by begin-
ning the book with this warning: “Readers should 
be fully aware that in chapters 6 through 10 they are 
leaving the world of hard science and entering into 
a much more speculative arena at the interface of 
history, economics, and human evolution.” In fact, 
he even states that “the conclusions presented in 
these chapters fall far short of proof” (15). If these 
conclusions fall far short of proof, they should 
not be presented in this book. A casual reader, 
for whom this may be their fĳirst introduction to 
human genetics, will not necessarily understand 
that these claims are not supported by scientifĳic 
evidence. This is disingenuous and irresponsible. 
And, in a neat little trick, if you disagree with 
Wade’s conclusions, you either are willfully refus-
ing to acknowledge that there are some genetic 
diffferences among races, or you secretly do agree 
but are afraid of being labeled a racist. This is in-
credibly demeaning to scientists studying human 
genetics and discounts much of their rigorous, 
well-performed research.
There are many good, interesting, and worth-
while reasons to study variation in humans. Wade 
argues that political motivations should not stall or 
dictate scientifĳic progress or areas of study. Yet the 
tone of this book suggests that Wade is simply “tell-
ing it like it is” to scientists who are cowed by politi-
cal correctness, and this has made many scientists 
defensive and angry. It is very important that when 
studying race, whether through the lens of social 
science, cultural or biological anthropology, or 
evolutionary biology, we do take into account the 
abusive history of aspects of these fĳields. Until 
recently, members of scientifĳic institutions have 
been overwhelmingly white and male, bringing in 
their own prejudices and a priori assumptions to 
such studies.
There are countless examples of the harmful 
nature of such homogeneity in science. One stand-
out example relates to brain size. In 1906, Robert 
Bennett Bean, an anatomy professor at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, published a paper describing the 
smaller size of African American brains compared 
with European brains, in particular, the frontal 
cortex responsible for higher cognitive functions. 
Bean not only reasoned that this is proof that are 
African Americans intellectually inferior but also 
expanded this to women and the underprivileged 
as well. In fact, Bean had failed to fĳind signifĳicant 
diffferences in brain size and explained in an ad-
dendum to the paper that the reason he found no 
diffference between the brains of blacks and those 
of whites was because he was measuring the brains 
of higher classes of blacks with those of the lowest 
classes of whites. His preformed prejudices resulted 
in him altering the data to fĳit his conclusions. His 
mentor re-examined the same brains Bean used 
in his study and found no diffferences (Mall 1909).
History is rife with examples of such prejudices 
informing scientifĳic thought, from inferiority of 
certain races, socioeconomic classes, and women 
(the repercussions of which can still be felt today) 
to the horrors of eugenics. This underscores the 
need for greater inclusivity in the sciences, to allow 
multiple perspectives and analysis. By hand wav-
ing, making unsubstantiated claims, and ignoring 
much of the history of human genetics studies 
and incredible advances in genomics, Wade’s argu-
ments on genetics and race are unconvincing and 
harmful and do a disservice to scientists studying 
human genetics and behavior.
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